

TOP SECRET

DOCUMENT NO. 28
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☒
☐ DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S S
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010
AUTH: HH 15-2
DATE: 5 JUN 1980 REVIEWER:

3 December 1959

Copy No. C 65

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



25X1

State Department review completed

TOP SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004800280001-8

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004800280001-8

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

3 December 1959

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

II. ASIA-AFRICA

140 Algeria: [The rebels are willing to begin negotiations with France in mid-December, following the current UN debate on Algeria and a meeting of the rebels' Revolutionary Council, according to a senior rebel official. [redacted] the Algerian's recent nomination of five imprisoned leaders to negotiate with De Gaulle was not final, and that a revised Algerian delegation would probably be named later this month to take care of French objections. He added that the rebels had no desire to weaken De Gaulle's position, and would be satisfied with a moderate UN Algerian resolution which would endorse the concept of a negotiated cease-fire.

*Notwithstanding the rebel commitment to conciliatory tactics, a considerable gulf exists between the French and the rebels, and Tunisian President Bourguiba continues to doubt whether De Gaulle can go further in clarifying his self-determination proposals.] [redacted]

25X1
N/O
Watch Committee Conclusions: [Situations susceptible of direct exploitation by Sino-Soviet bloc action which would jeopardize US interests exist in Laos and in the Middle East, particularly in Iraq. Although situations in Laos and Iraq appear relatively quiet at the present, there are many elements of continuing danger in both countries.] [] 25X1
[] 25X1

25X1
OK
Burma: The sweeping municipal election victories of former Premier Nu's political followers may soon force Burmese Army leaders to make a firm decision regarding the national elections scheduled for early 1960. The Nu party has achieved victories in seven of eight municipalities, including a sweep of all 35 council seats in Mandalay, Burma's second largest city. This presents the army with the alternatives of risking Nu's return to power, intervening vigorously for Nu's opponents in the national elections, or canceling the elections. []

25X1
OK
India: Finance Minister Desai estimates that India will need approximately \$294,000,000 in additional foreign aid to finance the remainder of the Second Five-Year Plan (1956-61). This much foreign exchange will be required to meet the payments falling due in 1960-61 on foreign debts and current imports which together will exceed India's expected earnings plus foreign aid already provided. About half this amount is likely to be covered by credits anticipated from the World Bank, Britain, West Germany, and Canada. Desai intends to open negotiations with these creditors and with US officials early in 1960 on aid for 1960-61. The foreign exchange deficit for India's Third Five-Year Plan (1961-66), now being drafted, probably will exceed \$1 billion a year. Desai recently reported to Parliament that prospects for foreign assistance for the Third Plan were "good," although it was too early to say whether the aid would be adequate. []
[] 25X1
[] 25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004800280001-8

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004800280001-8

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Burmese Army Concerned by Domestic Political Developments

The decisive local election victories of former Premier Nu's "Clean" faction of the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL), Burma's governing party until 1958, will force the army, which now rules the country, to decide soon whether to risk a "Clean" victory in the national elections scheduled for early next year and the return of Nu to the premiership, to intervene vigorously in the national elections themselves, or to cancel the elections. Despite the army's known preference for former Premier Ba Swe and his "Stable" faction of the AFPFL, Nu's followers have won overwhelmingly in seven of the eight municipal council elections held thus far, capping their victories by winning all 35 seats in Mandalay, Burma's second largest city.

Leaders of the "Stable" faction have discounted these victories, claiming that their own strength rests in the rural districts which will provide 227 of the 250 members in Burma's lower house of parliament, the Chamber of Deputies. Nevertheless, the decisive nature of Nu's victories, particularly in Mandalay, where his faction won even more decisively than the united AFPFL had in the past, has seriously undermined the "Stable" group's confidence and could cause rural voters to climb on Nu's bandwagon.

Army leadership is still divided on the proper course of action. Ne Win would probably be reluctant to cancel the elections, to which he is publicly committed, but he might sanction army intervention. Ne Win has no respect for Nu's administrative abilities and little faith in his integrity because of his opportunistic association with the pro-Communist National United Front in 1959.

25X1

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004800280001-8

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
 Scientific Adviser to the President
 Director of the Budget
 Director, Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
 Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
 Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
 Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
 Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
 Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State
 The Under Secretary of State
 The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
 The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
 The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
 The Counselor
 Director, International Cooperation Administration
 The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense
 The Deputy Secretary of Defense
 Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
 The Secretary of the Army
 The Secretary of the Navy
 The Secretary of the Air Force
 The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
 Commandant, United States Marine Corps
 The Director, The Joint Staff
 Chief of Staff, United States Army
 Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
 Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
 Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
 Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
 Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
 Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
 Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
 Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
 Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004800280001-8

Approved For Release 2001/04/29 : CIA-RDP80-00975A004800280001-8

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2001/04/29 : CIA-RDP80-00975A004800280001-8

TOP SECRET